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llcmarks on the Importance of Albert the Great's Analyses
and Use of the Thought of Avicenna and Averroes in the
D~ bomine for the Development of the Early Natural
Epistemology of Thomas Aquinas'
RICHARD C. TAYLOR (Milwaukee/1..euven)

While it is obvious that Thomas Aquinas must have learned a great deal in
the time he spent with Alben the Great as student in Paris and later as
student assistant in Cologne, much detailed analytical work remains to be
done to unlock all the keys to understanding just what the young Italian
learned and gleaned of his teacher during his time with the German master.
In this article I share what 1 consider to be one of the keys to determining
the major source of the account of natural human intellectual knowledge
in the early thought of Aquinas. My focus is on the De homine2 of Albert,
awork generally agreed to have been completed ca. 1242,3 and Book 2 dis
tinction 17, question 2, article I of the Commentary on the Sentences• by

1

The present article is

:1

preliminary study of the importance of the though1 of

Alben the Great in his De homi,1e for that of the young Thomas Aquinas on the human
iairllrct. I will provide a more detailed study of these issues discussed elsewhere. Katia
lllUle alludes ieveral times to the likelihood of the importance of the De homine to the
early thought of Aquinas in her article, Transforming Aristotelian Philosophy: Alexan
clu of Aphrodisias in Aquinas's Early Anthropology and Eschatology, in: Przeglad
Tominyczny 21 {2015), 175-217.
1 Albertus

Magnus, De bomine, H . Anzulewicz/ J.R. 'Soder (eds.), in: Alberti Magni

Opera Omnia, t. XXVII, Pars II, Munster 2008.
1

On the dating of this work, see H. MohJe/ H . Anzulewicz et al. (ed.), Albertus

llapus und sein System der Wis en chaften: Schlusseltexte in Obersetzung, lateinisch
Maucls, Miinster 201 I, 28. The issue discussed here is treated in part by R.. Miller. An
Aapect of Averroes' Influence on SL Albert, in: Mediaeval Studies 16 (1954), 57-71.
liowtver, Miller's account which draws on various works by Albert aims to show the
~ s of the teachings of Albert and Aquinas on the soul My focus here is ruore
~ on the accounts of {i) the possible and agent intellect as powers of the soul and
~ ~ intelligibles in act or ,pecies intelligibiles as developed in the De homine of Albert
••study of Averroes and Avicenna which is important for the development of the
eulyCOIICeption of intellect and natural epistemology by the Aquinas.
4
• For thu 1nicle I use a new unpublished text provided by Dr. Adriano Oliva, O.P.,
~ t of the Commissio Lconina in Paris. English translations come from the ap
~ iny study, Aquinas and the Arabs: Aquinas's First Critical Encounter with the
T
of Averroes on the InteUect, In 2 Sent. d. 17, q . .2, a. 1, in: LX. L6pez-Farjeat/J.
~ (eds.), Philosophical Psychology in Arabic Thought and the Latin Aristoteli
~ of the 13th Century, Pari5 2013, 142-183, 277-296. There in notes 10 the transla
._ I indicate how the new text differs from the edition of R..P. Mandonnet in P.
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Thomas Aquinas. In what follows here (1) I provide a brief account of the
earliest teachings of Thomas on the epistemology of human knowledge in
this article. (2) I then examine in detail texts of Albert on the nature of the
agent and possible intellects in which he develops his own tea.c hing through
careful study of the writings of Averroes and Avi.cenna. Here I explain how,
through systematic misunderstanding of Averroes, Albert develops a
teaching on these intellects that was foundational for the thought of Aqui
nas. (3) Finally, I conclude with some brief remarks on the importance of
philosophy in the Arabic tradition to the thinking of these two Latin mas
ters.

1. Aquinas on Natural Epistemology in his Commentary on the Sentences:

In 2 Sent d.17, Q.2, A. 1
Thomas Aquinas first sets out details of his own understanding of natural
epistemology in the· second book of his Commentary on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard at Distinction 17, Question 2, Article 1, .,Whether there is
one soul or intellect for all human beings", written ca. 1252-1254. He does
so in dialogue with the two great thinkers of the Arabic tradition who pro
foundly influenced rhe development of .epistemology in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, Avicenna and Averroes. In that article, Aquinas both
uses Avicenna to refute Averroes on the need for a material intellect shared
by all human knowers and Averroes to refute Avicenna on the need for a
shared agent intellect. He also draws upo~ both for key aspects of his own
epistemology. Much of his teaching on natural epistemology set forth there
remained foundational in his later thought.
The solutio of the article is composed of two major sections. In ~e
first section Aquinas provides a detailed account of the reasoning of his
philosophical predecessors for their positions together with his critical ref
jection of their views. Here he makes clear his own impressive depth 0
understanding of his sources as well as his sophisticated critical insights
into arguments relevant to the formation of his own quite distinct do~
trine. After noting that .,nearly all the philosophers after Aristotle" 5 taug t
a doctrine of the unity of the Agent Intellect for all human beings, he
on to explain the terminology used for the four sorts of intellect: possi _e
or material intellect, agent intellect, intellect in act, and intellect ma posi. d.1spos1t1on,
. .
. Iogy most Iy d epen d ent on A v1cerma
.
termmo
a.nd Averroes,
f h •r
ttve
After noting the incompatibility with Catholic religious teachings O t ei

g-~f

.

magistri Pc·

Mandonnet (ed.), S. Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros Sentenuarum
tri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis, t. 2, Parisiis 1929.
.
d he A,abl.
5 For an Eng~sh translation of chis entire article see Taylor, Aquinas an t
cited in the previous note.
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accounts and asserting that for them the agent intelJect and possible intel
lect differ in substance, Aquinas then largely follows the analysis of Aver- ·
~sin the long Commentary on the De Anima, 6 at times also drawing on
the De Anima and Metaphysics of Avicenna. In accord with the arguments
provided by Averroes, Aquinas goes on to reject the teachjngs of Alexander
of Aphrodisias and Ibn Bajja (Avempace), Avicenna, Themistius and The
ophrastus, finally turning agajnst Averroes himself with a refutation of the
Cordolnn's own teachings. He then presents his own view in the second

section.
I will not detail aJI the reasoning of Aquinas here but rather consider
iust four teacrungs he establishes in this :inicle. In the solutio he writes,
(1) .I say with Avicenna that the possible intellect comes into existence, but

does not go out of existence with the body, that it is diverse in diverse [human
beings], and that it is multiplied according to the division of matter in diverse
individuals, just as other substantial fonns."

and
(2) .And I also add that the agent intellect is diverse in diverse [human be
ings], for it does seem unlikely that there does not exist in the rational soul
some principle which can fulfill a natural operation."

(1) is in contradiction to Averroes and is established after the rejection of

~ two subject theory which has che understood intelligible somehow both
111 the

separate shared Material Intellect as an eternal intelligible and in the

Pl:"licular human theoretical intellect as a perishable intelligible. Aquinas
~JCC_ts this because the known intelligible would not be the s:ime thing in
~ different human and transcendent subjects. Aquinas' account is estab
~b~ ~onsequent to his refutation of the teaching of Averroes that the
IDtelli~bles may exist only in one single shared subject since existence in a
~harality of subjects would require the panicularization of the intelligible
I D ~ of the multiple knowers. Aquinas rejects this notion that particu
~ty precludes intelligibility and instead follows Avicenna in holding that
~11 matte~ that precludes intelligibility. Instead, Aquinas insists that each
~ being has his or her own receptive personal material or possible in.. as a power of the human oul. This power receives not the very in
~ble which is unique and existing in the separate Material Intellect ac
~ g to Averroes, but rather an intelligible species which is a represen
tation an~ content bearing ratio of the namre of things of the world, not of
leparate antelligibles.
:

~ ~ t f~Uows I cite t~ Latin of Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Mag

. . . . ~ l i s De Antma l.,bros, F. Stuart Crawford (ed.), Cambridge, MA 1953
lllllt. licha h of Averroes of Cordoba's Long Commentary on the De anim.a of Aris
- ~ C. Taylor (tr. and intro.), Th~resr-Anne Druart (subeditor), New Haven
•
ns of both are abbreviated LCDA.

133

Richard C. Taylor

(2) involves the rejection of the doctrine of the shared agent intellect
which Aquinas earlier characterized as a common doctrine of nearly all the
philosophers, a doctrine shared by Avicenna and Averroes though with dif
ferent understandings. This cannot be so, Aquinas reasons, because the
power of intellectual abstraction - which is essential to th~ definition of a
human being and also essential to the teleolcigy of what it is to be a human
knower - cannot be something outside the essence of the human as knower.
Otherwise human beings would not be intelligent per se but rather only per
accidens. That is, knowing would not be an operation natural to human be
ings but rather in some sense a super- or extra-natural operation made pos
sible by something external to the soul.
For Aquinas, then
(3) ,, [T]he soul has a power by which it makes sensible species to be intelligible
[species] in act, and this power is the agent intellect. And [the soul] has a
power by which it is in potency fo'r being made ia the act of determinate know
ing brought about by a sensible thing's species made intelligible in act, and this
power or potency is called possible intellect."

Aquinas sets aside the difficulties and presents out his own doctrine in (3).
Averroes had accounted for the unity of human intellectual knowledge
needed for shared discourse and sciemific understanding by having a single
Material Intellect receiving and containing true intelligibles in act ab
stracted by the Agent Intellect. 7 AccoJ"ding to Aquinas, Avicenna had as
serted a common Agent Intellect to which human knowers had to connect
or from which they had to receive an emanation 8 which enables human
7 See R.C. Taylor, Themis1ius and the de;velopment of Averroes' noetics, in: ~L
Friedman/J.-M. Counet (eds.), Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle's De Anima rhilo
sophes Medi~vaux, LVIII), Louvain-la-Ne\lve e1 al. 2013, 1-38; and LCDA English, mtroduction lxiii sqq.
b
8 Aquinas does not detail his understanding of the doctrine of Avicenna here ut
he does spell it out in his later Summa Contra Gentiles. There he clearly asserts th ailfor ·
Avicenna .the in teltigibles in act (species intelligibiles) flow into our possible inte
from the Agent lntellec1 which itself [Avicenna] asserted to be a certain separate ~u stance." (SCG 2.74} Though common to the Latin tradition, this is not correct u_n
standing of the view of Avicenna. For Avicenna, the intelligible in act is generate~ m ~
individual rational soul thanks to the light of the Agent Intellect. Since h~ hol ~ 1 ;;
there is no intellectual memory in individual rational so\lls, later apprehension a~ \ 1
of abstracted intelligibles in act are obtained through a connection to the separat: ~ 51
lntellec1 which contains all ITTtelligibles in act of the sublunar world. One of I lle m _1
Al • · Inte ec1u;u
valuable recent a_ccounts of Avicenna on this is that o~ To~maso, P_~a Ill as and Its
Knowledge, Ac11ve lntellect and Intellectual Memory in Avicenna s Kitabal-N: I ZS
Aristotelian Background, in: Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica me . ,eva e b. u· 'bles Ill act a
A tln(2014), 131-183. Alpina, however, insists that for Avicenna t he 1nte 1~ 1
stracted by the individual human knower must subsequently be stored m th: ge:ene}'
tellect. Yet that is not possible since the Agent Intellect does not have re~ept~ve[oof the
for those abstracted intelligibles. It seems more likely that the abstraet1ng g t

e:t

a
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intellectual understanding only so long as this connection remained active.
While Avicenna held that human beings do have a bodily power of memory,
they do not have individual intellectual memories. The shared discourse and
intellectual understanding of science as necessary and true 9 which Aver.roes
founded in a very different way in the shared separate and eternal Material
Intellect, Avicenna grounded in the separate Agent Intellect and its con
nection to the human rational soul. Aquinas, however, grounds knowledge
in the individual human knower through intrinsic powers belonging to the
panicula.r human soul, the abstracting power called agent intellect and the
power receptive of the abstracted intelligible called possible (scil., material)
intellect. Th.rough these powers the individual human being apprehends the
natures of things o.f the world. He writes: ,,For the sensible thing is intelli
gible in potency and has a nature distinct in act. Yet there is in the soul an
intellectual light in act. But the determination of knowing with respect to
thiB or that nature is there in potency, as the p~pil is in potency with respect
to this or that color. For this reason the soul has a power by which it makes
sensible species to be intelligible [species] in act, and this power is the agent
intellect. And [the soul] has a power by which it is in potency for being
made in the act of determinate knowing brought about by a sensible thing's
~pecies made. intelligible in act, and this power or potency is caJJed possible
mtellect." 10

In the response to the third objection Aquinas writes,
(4) .. [A]ccording to Avicenna, the understood species can be considered in
":o ways, either with respect to the being that it has in the intellect, and in
this way it has singular being, or with respect to the fact that it is a likeness of
such an understood thing, to the extent that it leads to the knowledge of it,
and on the basis of this part it bas universality. 11 [This is] because it is not a
~nt Intellect that causes the abstraction of inteUigibles from images in the human

:d both abstracts (sciL separates from matter) the intelligible for the individual human
. at the same time establishes a connection between the abstracted intelligible in the
~~ soul and the Agent Intellect .. For this teaching by Avicenna, it may well be that

~ . ence of the Paraphrase ofthe De Anima by Themistius is present for this teaching.
something I _e~lore further in my forthcoming article, Avicenna '.111d th~ [ssue
Ca llectual ln1elJ1gibles, for the Routledge History of Philosophy of Mind senes, M.
A ~ n (ed.). It should be noted that in the same section Aquinas himself recounts
view that individual rational souls do not have intellectual memory but must
~he separate Agent Intellect to access previously abstracted intelligibles in act.
101nstocle, P~terior Analytics 1.4.
11 aylor, Aquinas and the Arabs, Le. (note 4), 292 (appendix).
Du ~e~ _Aquinas follows Avicenna, AI-Shifa', AI-Ilihiyyat, v. 2, M.Y. Musa/S.
tio ffYi/_ ~!•d (eds.), Cairo 1960, 5.1, 205-6. ,.This form, although a univ-ersal in relaa 10 111
d1Vldua1s. ·ts an m
· d.1v1"d ual m
· relauoo
·
· w h1c
· b tt· ,s
· ~·
Frinced,
bein
to the particular sou I in

ofln:

linr~•s
"Z!
cally

. g_one of the forms of the mind. And, because individual souls are numen

lh. ~y, '.1 _is pos:iblc for this un~ve~al form

to be numerically many from the aspect
individual. The Mecaphy ,cs of The Healing, M.E. Mannura (er.), Provo, Utah
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likeness of this thing insofar as it is this thing but rather according to the na
ture in which it agrees with others of its species." 12

Here Aquinas further displays his famous doctrine of intelligible species or
fonns as what he will later call representations and rationes of the natures
of things, 13 wherein the object of human intellectual w,derstanding of
things of the natural world is the nature as specific difference in the
things: 4 In this the views of Aquinas and Averroes are alike 15 regarding the
source of intelligible content, namely, the things of the world, but they dif
fer substantially regardirig the locus of the intelligibles in act after abstrac
tion. Although Averroes holds the intelligibles in act to be derived by way
2005, 157. Jfaec autem forma, quamvis rerpectu individuorum sit univ malis, tamm, res
pectu animae singularis in qua impn"mitur, est individua; ipsa enim est una ex form is qUlll!
sunt in intellectu, et quia sfogulae animae s11nt multae numero, tune eo modo quo sunt par
ticulares habebunt ipsaealiud intellectum 1mivmale." Avicenna Latinus. Liber de Philoso
phi.a Prima sive Scientia Divine, V-X, S. Van Riet (ed.), Louvain/ Leiden 1980, 238. As
Van Riet notes, the Latin suffers from an omission here. Still, Aquinas is able to take
from this passage the view of Avicenna that the universal is received in a plur.:ility of
individual human souls or iriteUects without losing its nature as a.n intelligible.
12 This is Aquinas 1s teaching on intelligible species or forms according to which the
intellect apprehends the natures of things in the world. The likely source of this language
is Avicenna. The Latin Avicenna has: "Cum ergo dicimus quod natura universalis fubet
me in his sensibilibus, non intelligimus quod ex hoc quod est universalis, scilicet secundum
hunc modum universalitatis, sed intelligimus quoq natura cui accidit univmalitas habet esse
in istis signatis. ~ Avicenna. Latinus. Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divine, ~-2,
244. AI-Shifa', AI-Ilahiyyat, v. 2, I.e., 211 .• If we then say that the universal nature ein sts
in external things, ·we do riot mean in as much as it is universal i.n this mode of universa
lity; rather, we mean that the nature to which universality occurs exists in things external
(to the mind] .~ The Metaphysics of The Healing, M.E. Marmura (tr.), 161.
.
13 See, for example, Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, Opera omma. t.
22, v. l, fasc. 2, Rome 1970, q. 2, a 5 ad 6 & ad 7.
.
. .
1 • In the later Quaestiones Disputat4e De Anima he writes, .Alt bough the intellig_
,
ble species by which the intellect formally undemands is i_n the poss ible intellect of th15
or that human being, on the basis of which there are many possible intellects.' ne~ert~eh
less that which is understood through a species of this sort is one, if we consider It wit_
respect to the thing understood, because the universal which is understood by each~
the same in all [human beings]. And th:it what is one in all ca.n be understoo~ throut
species multiplied in diverse [huma.n beings] occurs on account of immate_n_ality of the
species which represent the thing without the individuating material condmons on t] ~
basis of which one nature in species is multiplied in number in diverse [human bemg_~j 
- .{L} icet species intelligibilis q1ta intellectus fomzaliter intelligit sit i11 intellect~ P011W . ~
. . ueI 1·11·1us hom1ms,
· · ex quo mtt'
· Jiectus poss,"b"/
1stius
1 es sunt p Iures, t·d tame,, quod mte zgitu.
per hui"smodi species est u11um, si consideremus habito respectu ad rem intel~ectaml ~u;:
uniuersale quod intelligitur ab utroque est idem in omnibus. Et quod per species m~
catas in diuersis id quod est unum in omnibus possit intelligi, contingit e:c m,matena 1 ._
.
. /I'bus con dmom
. . "bus
. maiff,
. , .., "duant1busA, e.x .quts
specierum,
que representant re,n ab sque matena
.
. .
. d.
. • Thomas quina '
bus una natura secundum speciem muitlp/zcatur numero in iuers~s.
3 . d 7.
Quaestiones Disputatae De Anim:i, 8.-C. Bazan (ed.), Rome/Pans 1996, q. S, a 'a
15 And Avicenna bimsdf as well. See note 8.

;:,e
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of abstraction and transference from imagined intentions or phantasms in
the human imagination, he regards the separated intelligibles in act onto
logically present in the Material InteUect.to be the proper intelligible object•
of human scientific understanding. In his late treatise On the unity of the
intellect against theAverroists, Aquinas called attention to this and remarked
that Averroes had somehow inadvertently fallen into a form of Platonism
in bis doctrine of the intellect. 16 For Avicenna, as we have seen, imelligibles
are described as coming to be in a plurality of human receptive intellects in
a procedure involving an emanation (Jay<!) from the separate Agent Intel
lect and by a conjoining (itti$al) with the separate Agent Intellect. 17 Aqui
nas rejected this role for a transcendent Agent Intellect because he under
stood that to mean that the intelligibles in act themselves are emanated to
the human rational soul by the Agent Intellect and because he also rejected
Avicenna's view that the rational soul does, ,not have its own intellectual
memory. 18 Instead, Aquinas embraced the abstractionist account he saw in
Averroes which derives the content of intelligibles solely from the world,
while holding firmly that agent intellect and material or possible intellect
are powers of the human soul, not separate substances.
In sum, in the Commentary on the Sentences Aquinas himself chose to
follow Avicenna in the view that the possible ime!Ject comes into being in
each individual with the body, is multiplied in different human beings as
individual for each, and does not perish with the death of the body. And he
followed Avicenna's famous understanding of the threefold consideration
of essences, in things, in the mind and in itself distinct from the other two
~ys. 19 For Aquinas the form or species in the external thing comes to be
~n t_h~ mind of the _human knower through abstraction carried out hy the
1nd1v1dual soul's power of agent intellect. However, Aquinas declined to
follow Avicenna's conception of the separate Agent Intellect and instead
~ded that it is not improbable that the agent intellect must also be intrin
sically present individually in each human being since that is required for
the natural operation of intellectual understanding belonging to the human
soul. In the last section of his solution in this article Aquinas also argues
that the agent intellect and the possible intellect, though powers of the soul
constituting what together makes up the general human intellectual power,
must be understood as. two diverse powers of the soul. For this distinction

16

See Sancti Tbomae de Aquino, De unitate intellectus contra averroistas, Opera
Olnrua '43, Rome 1976, 312, lines 164-70.
:: See note 8 regarding the correct undemanding of Avicenna.
See note 8.
•

ed.

1
' See M.E. _Marmura, Quiddity and Universality in Avicenna, in:~- Mo_rewedge
~• Neoplatomsm and Islamic Thought, Albany, NY 1992, 77-87; reprinted m Prob~111 Islamic Philosophy. Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali and Other
or Muslim, Thinkers, .Binghamton, NY 2005, 61-70.

~
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of powers in the soul Aquinas draws directly on Averroes's distinction of
the separate intellects and their proper activities. 2°For Aquinas, the power
of soul called agent intellect as ,,an intellectual light in act" is ,,a power by
which [the soul] makes sensible species to be intelligible [species] in act"
by separation or abstraction of the inte_lligible, while ' the power of soul
called possible intellect is ,,a power by which it is in potency for being made
in the act of determinate knowing brought about by a sensible thing's spe
cies made intelligible in act. "21 The innovations of Aquinas in this discus
sion, then, are largely in his rejection of the roles of separate Agent or Ma
terial Intellects of Avicenna and Averroes and his insistence that these must
be understood as two distinct powers intrinsic to the individual human
soul. Regarding this conception so fundamental to all his later discussions
of the human soul and its powers of intellectual understanding, Aquinas
was preceded by perhaps ten years by his teacher, Albert the Great.

io .Unde necesse est, cum hoc quod posuimus quod proportio intentionum I ymagina
tarum ad intellectum materialem est sicut proportio sensibilium ad sensus (ut Aristoteles po5r
dicet), imponere alium motorem esse, qui facit eas movere in actu intellectum maten"alem
(et hoc nichil ·est aliud quam facere eas intellectas in actu, abstrahendo ea.s a materia). ~t
quia hec intentio cogens ad ponendum intellectum agentem alium a matrriali et a { 0 "': 15
rerum quas intellectus maten"alis compreheiulit est similis intentioni propter quam vis11s m·
diget luce, cum hoc quod agens et recipiens ..Jia sunt a luce [. .. J.u LCDA, Latin, 438·9i
English, 438-439: nHence, in view of our having asserted that the relation of the ,mag·

ined intentions { 439} to the material intellect is just as the relation of the sensibles to
the senses (as Aristotle will say later), it is necessary to suppose that there is an°th er
mover which makes [the intentions] move the material intellect in act, and this is nol hing but to make [the intentions) intelligible in act by separating them from matter.~
cause this intention, which forces the assertion of an agent intellect different from t e
material intellect and different from the forms of things which the material intellect
prehends, is similar to the intention on account of which sight needs light, in view of e
fact that the agent and the recipient are different from light[ ...]."
.
. "k I
21 Taylor, Aquinas and the Arabs, Le. (note 4), 292 {appendix). Aqumas_ 15 b; Y
drawing on both Averroes and Avicenna here for an explanation the image of lighi_c_at
Aristotle used at De Anirna 3.5, 430a 15 (."the intellect making all things as a ~isp~• 11 ~;
(he:ris) such as light") both of whom assert teachings of intellectual abstracuon Y I d
light of the separate Agent Intellect. This is further discussed below. It should be note 1
that the doctrine of intellectual abstraction of intelligibles in act by a transfer of con~~flg
from images of things of the sensible world is not at all explicit in Aristotle. The teac 1~e
seems, rather, to be an interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias read back 1010 •1 o,
texts of Aristotle by later thinkers. See R.C. Taylor, The Epistemology of A_b strah~ltiOo. R.C. Taylor/LX. Lopez-Farieat
· (eds.), Routledge C.Ompanwn
· to Islaro1c P 1 05
m:
phy, London/New York 2015, 273-284.

:r
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2. The Arabic Tradition and Albert the Great's Epistemology
in the De homine
While later in bjs career Albert rejected the view of Averroes that for intel
lectual understanrung human beings share in the powers of the separately
existing Agent Intellect and Material lntellect, 22 in his De homine Alben
had a very different understanding of the texts of Averroes. 23 In this early
work in which Albert engaged in detail the writings of Avicenna and Aver
roes on the soul and intellect and formed a new conception of the human
powers of imellecc on the basis of a (mis)understanding of the teachings of
Averroes on intellect. Through a thoughtful and meticulous study of the
texts of Averroes, Albert came to the (false) conclusion that for Averroes
the intellects he discusses are powers intrinsic and individual for each hu
man sout2 4 Thinking himself to be followip,g the correct reading of Aver
roes, Albert then went on, with critique of Avicenna's doctrines of the
separate Agent Intellect and the lack of human intellectual memory, to
fonn a teaching that is largely the same that found later in Aquinas's Com
mentary on the Sentences at Distinction 17, Question 2, Article 1.
Among the most important texts of the De homine for this account
are those that follow below.

22

.Between the Summa de Creaturis, written in 1240-1, and the De Anima, written
!256, St. Albert discovered that Averroes did teach (1) that the agent intellect is not
~ pan of the soul, that is separate and not joined to the soul, (2) that everything which
~ _separate and then is conjoined must have some cause to account for its being con

•

Ill

Joined, (3) that one must discover what is the cause of the conjunction through which
the agent intelligence is conjoined formally to the possible intellect." Miller, Averroes'
l~u_ence on St. Albert, I.e. (note 3), 64, Also see A. de Libera, Metaphysique et
IIOeUque. Albert le Grand, Paris 2005, 281 sqq.
Thi ." This issue is discussed in Miller, Averroes' Influence on St. Albert, I.e. (note 3).
15 a val~a~le contribution from a time when the work of Averroes ":as less well
be ~ than It 1s today. Note that Miller misunderstands Averroes and thought him co
.£ dis~rbed by the lack of acceptance of his doctrine of the separate Material Intellect.
~en ID Averroes' own day the complications of his presentation were the source of
among his hearers and readers." Ibid., 64. In fact, however, Averroes was not
andressin~ c?ntemporaries but rather predecessors in the Arabic and Greek traditions
~Sttorung why they would not accept the unity of the Material Intellect since they
ac~d th~ unity of the Agent Intellect.
Thomasin hts ~he Psychology of Saint Albert the Great Compared With That Of Saint
of A • Washington, DC 1934, George C. Reilly gives valuable accounts of the thought
~
throughout_ many of his works but does not highlight Albert's (mis)_u nder
0
Fim A f '.'vcrr:oes m the De homine. See, for example, pp. 36-37. On the notions of
Aff:rroe
'Onroum_ a~d Second Averroism, see n. 31 below. That the texts and arguments_ of
Anuna son this issue were difficult to understand for Albert is noted by P. Hellme1.er,
des M et lntellecrus. Albert\ls Magnus und Thomas von Aquin iiber Seele und Imellekt
enschen, Munster 2011, 69 sqq.
·
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( 1) On the natu.re of the intellect Albert bolds in the De homine - as did
Thomas later - that the agent intellect and the possible intellect are powers
in the individual soul. Albert cites with precision the texts of Avicenna and
his followers al-Ghazali and Gundissalinus who hold that the Agent Intel
lect is the last of the hierarchy of immaterial separate substances and does
not exist in the individual human soul. This is a. view Alben rejects with
detailed argumentation, as the following texts demonstr;te:
(1.1) 402.40: "We concede that the agent intellect is in the soul." - "Con
cedimus quod intellectus agens universaliter est in anima." My emphasis.
(1.2) 408.68: ,,[Avicenna] expressly accepted that the Agent Intellect is the
separate intelligence of the tenth order of the separate intelligences." -

,,[E]xpresse accipitur quod intel!ectus agens est intelligentia separat;a decimi
ordinis intelligentiarum secondarum."
(1.3) But Albert himself in a sed contra remarks that these are in us and not
separate. 411.51: ,,Since, therefore, one of these is the agent intellect and
the other the possible [intellect], each of those intellects will be in us and
not a separate substance." - .,Cum igitur unum horum sit intellectus agens et
alternm possibilis,- uterque istorum intellectorum erit in nobis existens et non
separat.a substantia." My emphasis. In the solution at 412.72 -76 he affirms
this. See (1.5) below. 25
(1.4) 412.57-68: Albert clearly rejects the views of the phjJosophers who
say that the Agent Intellect is sep¥ate and efficient cause of human
knowing. He writes against ,,others" (sci!. Avicenna) that he rejects the
connection between the intellect as the tenth in the emanative hierarchy of
the heavens and the function of the Agent lntelJect. The notion that ,,the
human possible intellect moves a human being to be connected to the a.gent
imellect of the tenth order" (.,intellectus human us possibilis movet homin~
ad hoc quad conformetur intelligentiae agerzti decimi ordinis") and that .~ 10
this way the goodnesses flow from, the agent intellect into the possible

25 The phrase in nobil is commonly found in Averroes for whom the separate Agent
Intellect is forma nobis, SNrah /a-n,i, and in our soul, just as the separate Possible lntelle~;
is in our soul. In this Averroes is following Aristotle who writes at De Anima 3.S, 42;a .
that the two intellects are _in the soul", en re psyche. More of Albert's use of in_no s ;~
found at 17.9-10 (possible intellect); 25.57 (Aristotle); 38.24 (agent intellect: Avtc;nna'
40.74-41.2 sqq. (Avicenna): 414.27-38 (Ave.rroes); 438.64-439.4 (Averroes). On I e nlo. 1 Th e Agent
n
tion of the Agent Intellect as ,.form for us" in Averroes, see my aruc_ e,
.
·d;id
tellect as ,form for us' and Averroes's Critique of al-Farabi, in: Topicos (Unive_rsi sal
·
· City)
· 29 (2005), 29-51. Reprmt
· Wlt· h correc1·ons
in·
Univer
Panamenca.na,
1
Mexico
f Me.•
R_epresent~tion and the Ontology of Individuation. Procee~ings of t~e Society
itXiv
d1eval Logic and Metaphysics 5 (201 I), 25-44. Also see my mtroducuon t~ W
f the
sqq. Derived from Alexander of Aphrodisias and al-Farabi, this charactenzatio~ 0 tie
Agent Intellect is found in all three of his commentaries 011 the De .Anima of AnSIO ·

c:.
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intellect" (,.et hoc modo ftuunt bonitates ab intelligentia agente in intellectum
possibilem") is something Alben will have none of (»nos nihil horum dici
mNS"). This is further confirmed in his direct discussion of the agent intel
lect (415-416) where he writes in his solution concerning the constituent
pans of the human intellect 416.33-41: "We concede that the agent intelie~t
is pan of the soul [.•. ]. And on account of this we say that the agent intel
lect is part of the potential soul Rowing from it as ,that by which it is', or
act; but the possible [intellect] is the part of the soul flowing from it as
,what is' or potency." - .,,Concedimus q,wd intellectus agens est pars animae

[. ..). Et propter hoc dicimus quod intellectus agens est pars potentialis animae
/lMtns ab eo quod est ,quo est', sive actztS; possibilis autem est pan animae fluens
.b eo quod est ,quod est', sive potentia. ") In the response to the first objec
tion he confirms bis view as follows 416.5 1-53: .,,And on account of this the
agent and possible intellects can be intrinsic parts of the rational soul." - "Et
propter hoc inteilectus agens et possibilis possum esse intrinsicae partes animae
mionalis."' My emphasis.
•'
(l.5) 412.69: ln his solutio he follows the view of Averroes who says that
the human agent intellect is conjoined with the human soul, is simple and
does not itself have the intelligibles but instead brings them about in the
human possible intellect by abstracting them from phantasms . .,But we say
none of these things. For following Aristotle and Averroes we say that the
heavens do not have a soul beyond the intelligence, as was determined
above on the question o.f the heavens. And likewise we say that the human
agent intellect is conjojned to the human soul, is simple and does not pos
sess the intelligibles but brings them about in the possible intellect from
phantasms, as Averroes expressly says in [his J Commentary on De Anima."

- ~d nos nihil honmz dicimus. Sequentes enim A ristotelem et Averroem diCl
mNS CM/um non habere animam praeter intelligentiam, ut supra in quaestione
de CM/o determinatum est. Et similiter dicimus intellectum agentem human um
ts!~ coniunctum animae humanae, et esse simplicem et non habere intelligi
~ Sed agere ipsa in intellectu possibili ex phantasrnatibus, sicut expresse
dicit Averroes in commento /ibri de anima." My emphasis.
As we have seen, the doctrine of Averroes is that the Agent Intellect does
not have all the inteUigibles in it - as Albert correctly notes - but rather
abstracts them from images in the individual human soul and impresses
chem onto the separate Material or Possible Intellect. Both these are sepa
rate substances for Averroes and yet they must come to be present in the
~l <ftnaft) through a form of sharing and presence. This is required to be
t case because that in virtue of which something formally acts must be
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intrinsic to it. 26 Hence, for Averroes the separate substances, the Agent In•
tellect and the Material Intellect, must come to be in the soul, that is, in•
trinsic to it in the attainment of imelligibles in act while remaining sepa•
rately existing eternal and imperishible substances. But Alben does not un
derstand Averroes in this (correct) way but rather understands those two
intellects to be powers existing intrinsic to the individual human intellect
with each person having his or her own powers of agent and possible (scil.,
material) intellect.
Albert later changes his view and holds the common (and correct) un
derstanding of Averroes. But in the De homine be s~s the Cordoban write
that the intellects are .,in the soul" and° .,in us" 27 and interprets it as indicat
ing the agent and possible intellects are powers of the individual human
soul. Well aware of the importance of his way of understanding Averroes
for its contribution to a sound account of the soul, Albert quotes Averroes
on this point of the intellects being both ,.in the soul" and .,in us".
(1.6) 411.46-53: ,.Again, Averroes (writes]: ,Every intellect existing in us
has two actions. One is of the genus of affection and it is to understand;
the other [is] of the genus of action. And this is for abstracting these from
matter, which is nothing but to make them understood in act after they
were understood in potency.' Since, therefore, one of these is the agent in
tellect and the other the possible [intellect], each of those intellects will be
existing in us and not a separate substance." - Jtem, Averroes: , Omnis in
tellectus in nobis existens habet duas actiones. Quarum una est de genere pas

sionis, et est intelligere; alia de genere actionis, et est abstrahere eas a materia,
quod nihil aliud est quam facere eas intellectas in actu postquam erant intel
lectae in potentia.' Cum igitur unz,m horum sit intellectus agens et al.terum
possibilis, uterque istorum intellectu_um erit in nobis existens et non separata
1• On this notion in Averroes and Aquinas, see R.C. Taylor, Intellect as Incrin~ic
Formal Cause in the Soul according to Aquinas and Avem:ies, in: M. EI-Kais_y
Friemuth/J.M. Dillon (eds.), The Afterlife of the Platonic Soul. Reflections on Platonic
Psychology in the Monotheistic Religions, Leiden 2009, 187-220.
27 Averroes was correctly held by Aquinas, Bonaventura, Kilwardby and many ocb
ers to hJve taught that there are two separately existing intellectual substances, the ~gen;
Intellect and the Material (or Possible) Intellect,' Albert's early misunderstandmg ,0
Averroes found in the De homine contributed to the (false) assertion by R.A. Gaurb_,er
that there were two Averroisms, a First Averroism such as Albert held in the De hommt
which viewed the intellects as powers intrinsic to the human soul and a Second Averro_,sm
which viewed the intellects as separately existing substances. This Second Averrois~ ,
Gauthier claimed, is an inYention of the Christian theologians and not the genuine teacl •
ing of Averroes himself. As I have explained in the introduction to my English rrans a·
tion of Averroes, LDCA, xcix-civ, Gauthier was misled by reliance on incorrect ass;~
tions regarding teachings in the Arabic texts of Averroes by S. Gomez Nogales. d
LCDA introduction, ci. See ( 1.6). I will address the tangled issue of First and Secon
Averroism at length elsewhere.
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substantia."2s My emphasis. Note that here Albert is himself a witness to
the existence in his own day of two inte,rpretations of Averroes, one that
those intellects are separate substantial entities and the other that they are
powers of the human soul when he writes at 411.52-53, ,.both of those I
teUects will be existent in us and not a separate substance"' - .,uterque isto
rum inte/Jeduum erit in nobis existens et non separata substantia." 29

(1.7) 414.27-38: ,.And this is what Averroes says in his Commentary on
Book Three of the De Anima: ,It is evident that, when all the theoretical
inteUigibles are in us in potency, then the agent [intellect] is united with us
in potency, because it is not united with us except through them. And when
they are existing in us in act, then it too is united with us in act: For the
act of the agent intellect is determined by reference to the phantasms, and
in this way a determined [action] moves the possible intellect and brings it
forth into act, as the action of light is determinate in reference to colors
and in this MY a determinate [action] brings forth vision into act. And in
fliTtlle ofthis it is

evident that the agent intellect is not a substance full offorms."'

- .Et hoc est quod dicit Averroes in commento super tertium de anima: ,Ma
nifestum est, quoniam quando omnia speculafivafuerint in nobis existentia in
potmtia, tune et agens continuatur nobis in potentia, quia non continuator
nobis nisi per ilia; et cum fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, tune et ipse con
hnUdtur nobis in actu. t1o Actio enim intellectus agentis determinatur ad phan
tas'114, et sic determinata mO'llet intellectum possibilem et educ it eum in actum,
sic,a actio luminis determinatur ad co/ores, et sic determinata vis um educit in
actum. Et per hoc patet quod intellectus agens non est substamia separate
plena fonnis.• My emphasis. Albert's own view involves the rejection of
the view he found in Avicenna regarding an emanation of intelligibles from
the separate agent intellect. The human agent intellect is not full of forms
as A~hert understood the Agent Intellect of Avicenna, but rather is what
provides the power for a genuine abstraction or separation of fonns from
21

_L~D~ 49S; English, 39S: .,Let us say, therefore: the intellect existing in us has
is ascribed to us, one of the genus of affection, namely. under
and the other of the genus of activity, namely, to extract forms and denude
.of matters, which is nothing but making them intelligible in act after they were
111 ~tency f... ].• - ..Dicamus igitur: quoniam 4utem inteilectlls existens in nobis habet
lf;U ~ J wc,,ndum quod attribuitur nobis, quarum una est de / 465/ genei-e passionis

=ing,

two~t1v1t1es insofar as it

;m

(~n, ~ ~ ) . et .dia de genere acrionis (et est extrahere formas et denud4re eas a mate
riichil tst aliud ,risi facere eas intellectas in a.ctu postquam erant in potentia) { .. /."

J'li&,

9:"Sttnote 28.

retical'Ml· lCI?~ 500.599-603; English, 399. ,.It is evident [then) that when all the theer
the th lllte~~lcs exist in us in potency, it will be united with us in potency. When all
--~oreucal mtelligibles exist in us in act, it will then be united with us in act." f/Mod, C#m
•
~t
~"•nobism actu , ent, tpse
, tune copui,atus
,_
, actu."
nob' m

»~t

Jr,,,,,~
omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in pote11t~a,
~
C~•~"s 11obiscum in potentia. Et cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint
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the content of experience in phantasms or images.
Hence, for Albert the two intellects, agent and possible, are parts or powers
of the human soul:
(1.8) 416.52: ,,And on account of this the agent intellect and the possible
intellect are intrinsic parts of the rationaJ soul." - .,Et propter hoc iritellectus
agens et possibilis possunt esse iiminsicae panes animae rationalis." My em
phasis. That is in substance and definition the agent intelJect is a power and
principle of the soul for apprehending imelligibles. On this issue, Quid sit
intellectus agens secundum substantiam et diffinitionem (418.4), Alben
comes to the following conclusion:
(l.9) 419.5-8: ,,Solution: It should be said that the agent intellect in sub
stance and definition is a power and an active principle of intelligibles, and
on account of this the Philosopher says that the intellect is ,t hat by which
all things are made'." - ,,Solutia: Dicendum quod intellectus agens secundum

substantiam et diffinitionem est 'potentia et principium activum intelligibili
um, et propter hoc dicit Philosophus quod est intellectus ,quo est omnia facere',•
While for Albert the human separate intellect is not to be identified with
the human power of agent imelJect, still the human intellect in which
knowledge is realized (called the theoretical or speculative intellect) is
separate from matter and its concomitants:
(1.10) 419.41-43: ,,The [human] _separate intellect is not the same as the
agent intelJect but rather the speculative intellect is separate from matter
and its concomitants." - .,Separatus inteilectus non est idem quod agem ill·

tellectus; sed intellect1ts speculativus est separatus a materia et appendiis mate·
riae." Albert goes on to cite the same text of Averroes he had cited earlie,r' 1
now indicating that the possible intellect is affected by the formal act~a_liz·
ing character of the power called agent intellect and also by the intelligible
species received into it.
(1.11) 438.64-439.4: ,,For Averr~es says in [his J Commentary on the Thi~d
Book of De Anima that ,when all the theoretical intelligibles are in us 1~
potency, then the agent [intellect] is united with us in potency, b~c~use _11
is not united with us except through them. And when they are ex1sung in
us in act, then it too is united with us in act. ' 32 From this we take it that ~he
intellect is in potency to the species of the agent (intellect] and to the ~n
telJigible species. In this way it is in potency to two species at once.. -

,,Dicit enim Averroes super tertium de anima quod ,quando omnia sp~~tlvt
fuerint in nobis existentia in potentia, tune et agens continuatur no~ts 1~ P':
tentia, quia non cominuatur nobis nisi per ilia; et cum fuerint exr.stentui 111
31

32
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nobis in actu, tune et ipse continuatur nobis in actu.' Ex hoc accipitur quod
intt/Jectus est in potentia ad speciem agentis et ad speciem intelligibilis, et ita
est in potmtw ad. duas species simul." My emphasis.. To this Albert responds
at 439.31-37: ,.[Djicendum quod suscipit speciem agentis et speciem intelligi
bilis, sed illae duae species non sunt nisi actus ,mus. Species enim agentis est
dCt1IS sp«iei inte/ligibilis, sicut lux actus colons (. .. }."' - .,It should be said
that it ~ceives the species of the agent and the intelligible species, but those
two species are only one act. For the species of the agent is the act of the
intelligible species, as light is the act of color f... J." Th.is theoretical or
speculative intellect is the power of the possible intellect when we are in
the state of knowing.
(2) What is essentially the foundation of the doctrine of Aquinas on the
abstraction and apprehension of the species intelligibilis is also spelled out
clearly by Alben.
·•
(2.1) 435.47-69: ,,Solution: It should be said that all the intelligibles are de
nuded of matter and the concomitants of matter or stripped per se, and on
account of this the theoretical intellect is the species of aJI the intelligibles
and the same in act with them. But act has a twofold relation. One is to the
thing of which it is the act, and in this way it is the ratio of the thing and a
quiddity having no difference from it. For if it were to have a difference
according to that in which it differs, the thing known would not be cog
nized in vinue of that. For this reason the species which is in the soul ~ch is the principle of understanding the whole thing and the whole be
~~ of the thing - is taken completely as the act of the whole thing. Since it
IS ITI the intellect in this way, because it is in this way the principle of un
ders~ding, knowledge is the thing known in act and the theoretical intel
lect ~lS] th_e theoretical [intelligible] in act. It has another comparison to
that an wh,ch it is as in a subject and in this way it is not the principle of
understanding but rather the principle of being. Because there is in the in
!Cllect an accidental likeness, it causes in it accidental being; because there
~~ 1natunl form in the thing, it m~es in it natural bein?' Noting this t~e
nwosapher says that knowledge m some way is the thing known and m
another passage he ays that intellect is the same in act as that which is
understood, but the being is different. And likewise sense is the same in act
~~ ~ensible but its being is different, as we explained above." - ..Sol~~·~:
..,"'~ quod omnia intelligibilia cknudata sunt a materia et appendmtzs
~ wl nuda per seipsa., et propter hoc inteflectus speculativus species om
""- ln~igibili,un et idem act11 cum omnibus. Sed actus duplicem habet
~114m ad rem _cuius est a_ctm, et sic es_t ratio _
rei et quiditas
i/1,,,J in hem~ di/ferentiam ab 1psa. S1 emm haberet d.i.lfererz_t1am sec~ndum
. ~ di/ferret, non cognoscf?J'eturper ipsum res sczta; et zdeo speczes quae
at 111 4111Una, qHae est principium intelligendi totam rem et totum esse rei,

:Z::,olhonem.
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omnino accipitur ut actus rei totiuJ, et cum sic sit in inteilectu, eo q11od pri11cipi11m sic sit·intelligendi, est scientia res scita in actu, et intellectus speculativus
spec,datum in actu. Aliam habet comparationem ad id in q110 est itt in subiecto,
et sic non est principium inteiJigendi, sed principium esse; et quia in imellectu
est similitudo accidentatil, causat in ipso esse accidentaie; quia vero in re est
Jonna naruraiis, facit in ipsa esse naturale\ Et hoc atte,idens Philosophus diclt
quod scientia modo quodam est res scita, et in alio loco dicit quod intellcctus
est idem actu wm eo quod intelligitur, sed esse est aliud; et similiter sensus cum
sensibi/£ est idem actu, sed esse est aliud, sicut supra exposuimus."
This notion of the content but not the mode of being of the thing as
what is grasped Alben further emphasizes later at 446.9-11 when he writes
the following: .,The definition which is through the principles of knowing
is given in virtue of forms abstracted from the particular which are the ge
nus and difference." - .,Diffinitio a1itern quae est per principia cogr10scend1:
datur per fonnas abstractas a pa_rticulari, quae sunt genus et differentia."

(2.2) According to Averroes the ~bstracted intelligibles of human knowing

(intelligi.biles in actu) or, in the phraseology of Albert and Thomas, the spe
cies intelligibiles, are found in tbe separate Material lntelJect and also in the
disposition of' the theoretical intellect belonging to the perishable human
soul. In fact, for Avicenna - since he denies intellectual memory to the in·
dividual human rational soul - those intelligibles must be available in the
separate Agent Intellect. 33 This issue Albert addresses at 439 sqq. in the
article, ,. Whether the dispos.i tion
the theoretical intellect remains in it
after apprehension or in some memory which is pan of the rational soul, or
does not ai: aU remain in the rational soul." - ,.Utrum habitus intcllecrus spe

of

culativi post considerationem manet 'in ipso, vel in memori.a aliqua quae sit
pars animae rationalis, vel omnino non manet in anima rationali." He ex
plains that for Avicenna the apprehensive power of the soul is not _the_same
as the retentive power. For him, says Albert, the int.elligible species 15 not
retained in the possible intellect because it is an apprehensive power. _He
then writes at 442.5-17, .,We, however, say that it remains in tbe pos 5 i~le
intellect, because Aristotle expressly says that memory and recollecti~n
have their own acts of apprehension. Hence, it is false that to apprehe nd JS
not characteristic of the retentive part. For in the case of bodily powers one
power receives while another retains, for it is characteristic of dampness t~
receive well and of dryness to retain well. But in the intellectual power It
belongs to the same power to receive and to retain. This is because the aces
.
•
h" s [themof opposites there are not opposed smce they are separate t mg
selvesJ opposite to matter and the potency of acting and being acted up~n
Hence, the possible intellect receives the forms and inrelligibles and retains

n See note 8.
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them." - ,.Nos autem dicimus quod manet in in teilectu possibili, quod A risto

teles expresse dicat quod memoria et reminiscentia habent mos actus apprehen
sionis. Unde faisum est quod thesauri non sit apprehendere. In virtutibus enim
corpMalibus alterius quidem virtutis est recipere et alterius retinere; humidi
mim est bene recipere, et sicci bene retinere. Sed in imellectuali virtute ei
usdem virtutis est recipere et retinere, eo quod oppositorum actus ibi non sunt
oppositi, cum sint separata opposita a materia et potentia agendi et patiendi.
Unde intellectus possibilis recipit formas intelligibilium et retinet eas."

It is quite clear in this work that Albert was very familiar with the ab
stractionism of Avicenna. Bue Albert rejected the common view attributed
to Avicenna that the Agem Intellect is a separate substance and that human
efforts with bodiJy external and internal sense powers were only a prepara
tion for the reception of emanated intelligibles from the Agent Intellect.
Albert also rejects the actual teaching of Averroes who held the Agent In
tellect to be a separate intellectual substa~ce in its own right. Still, Albert who understands this to be a power of the individual human soul - follows
Averroes in finding for it only the role minimally required for the comple
tion of Aristotle's account: the agent intellect is what provides the power
for the abstraction or separation of the content intelligible in potency in
the images or phantasms derived from sensory experience of the world. But
Albert misread Averroes likely because of the novelty of Averroes's doc
trine of the separate and shared Material Intellect and also because Albert
did not understand the intent of Averroes's repetition of the phraseology
of ,in the soul' and ,in us' used to describe the role of the separate Agent
Intellect and separate Material Intellect in relation to the human soul. The
argument from intrinsic formal cause set forth by Averroes and later used
by Aquinas against Averroes, required for Averroes that the separate intel
~ - so essential to the natures of human beings as animals that are ra
tional - be formally ,in the soul' for human intellectual understanding.3
But in the De homine Albert holds that the agent intellect and the possible
(material) intellect are not separate substances but rather immaterial pow
ers of the soul separate from body, as the text at 411.51 quoted above indi
cates clearly with the phrase in nobis.35

14

See Taylor, Intellect as Intrinsic Formal Cause, I.e. (note 27).
"It is wonh noting that el ewhere Albert works r.o bring together the human agent
and the Augustinian notion of the Binner teacher". For discussion of this, see
~Gluer, Albert the Great and Mystical Epistemology, in: I.M. Resnick (ed.), A Com
~ to Albert the Gre:u. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences, Leiden/Boston
s..u!37-161. Note, however, that the author's statement regarding the separate Agent
t that Averroes .identified it with God" at p. 146 is incorrect.
.
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3. Conclusion
Alben, working closely witb the texts of Avicenna and Averroes, con
structs in the De homine wbat is remarkably similar to, if not the original
source of, the doctrine of intelligible species later developed by Thomas in
the latter's Commentary on the Sentences at In 2 Sent d.17, Q.2, A. l. 36 But
Albert was able to do so only by his systematic misreading of the compli
cated and challenging texts and arguments of Averroes. Some 8-10 years
later Thomas understood correctly the doctrines of the separate intellects
set fonh by Averroes and directly combatted the teachings of Averroes~
well as those of Avicenna regarding their consequences for human knowing
through his own reexamination of their texts. Though surely following the
lead of Alben, Thomas went back to the Arabic translations and rethought
them for himself in the development of his own teaching. Both made valu
able use of the teachings of Averroes and substituted in place of what they
read as an Avicennian emanation the account of Averroes which asserted
that the content of intellectual understanding is garnered from the experi
ence of the world without any reference to preexisting intelligibles in act in
the Agent Intellect.
·
The preliminary account of the teachings of Albert and Thomas on
human intellectual thought is another witness to the importance of the cl~
sicaJ rationalist Arabic philosophical tradition to the development of phi
losophy and theology in the Medieval Latin Christian tradition.

1• Miller examines sever.ii of the texts reconsidered in the present article an~ con
cludes that -ffhe basic position of Aquinas] is in no way compatible "'i~h the _bJ.slC Po"
sition of his master, St. Albert [ ... ]. Starting from basic p05itions so d~metncal~ 0[
1•
posed, the intrinsic logic of philosophical ideas will never permit St. Albert a
Thomas to maintain the same position on many dependent problems such as t~e na~~
of the agent and possible intellects, the proper object of the intellect, :ibst i:3ct:0 "•. 11 u
mination, the soul's knowledge of itself, of Angels and of God, immonalny.
Averroes' Influence on St. Albert, Le. (note 3), 69-70. This is a bit strong th0
is correct that the accounts of Aquinas and his teacher differ a great deal on t e n~t~hr
of the soul and its intellectual powers. Still, it remains the case that chc acco:n~ 0 • of
human soul and its powers which Alben crafted in his early De homine on\ e Aas•~nas
his mistaken reading of Averroes proved to be foundational for that of the ear Y qui
in ways that persisted through the works of Aquinas.
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